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THE UNEASY INTERFACE BETWEEN DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
David A. Wirth*
INTRODUCTION
Under the title "How the Foreign Policy Machine Broke Down,"' a
recent article in the New York Times Magazine levels a scathing but in-
sightful attack on United States foreign policy since World War II. The
article's central thesis can be summarized in one sentence:
The United States, because it became a superpower during the early nu-
clear era, created for itself a foreign-policy-making machinery that in the
end had little to do with the principles underlying the country's institu-
tions and political beliefs
The author then goes on to state that, with the end of both the Cold
War and divided government in Washington, the United States can and
should get on with the important business "of making a democratic for-
eign policy."3
The New York Times article addresses traditional national security and
foreign policy concerns, focusing on the use of military force and pro-
viding such examples as the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Grenada, Noriega
and Panama, Iraq and Operation Desert Storm, and Iran-Contra." The
same analysis applies equally well or better to the "new" foreign policy
issues, which are more concerned with human welfare than military
security and which have assumed relatively greater prominence since the
end of the Cold War. These issues include population, trade, labor,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Vir-
ginia. This work was supported by grants from the Creswell Foundation and the Fran-
ces Lewis Law Center of Washington and Lee University. This Essay was adapted
from an article by the author, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law
and American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INTL L. 377 (1992).
1. Mark Danner, How the Foreign Policy Machine Broke Down. N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 34.
2. Id
3. Id (emphasis in original).
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public health, and the environment. In contrast to many longstanding
foreign policy preoccupations, these recently invigorated areas have
direct analogues in national law and regulation.
Indeed, the "new" foreign policy concerns are, in many cases, charac-
terized by an "internationalization" of areas previously considered to be
strictly domestic matters subject only to municipal law and regulation.
For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement5 and the Urn-
guay Round of Trade Negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATTM' potentially subject most domestic environmental,
public health, and safety regulations to new trade disciplines as possible
non-tariff barriers to trade.
This Essay argues that there is great urgency for rethinking both
international and domestic decision making processes applicable to fields
governed by domestic regulation-specifically, the law of the environ-
ment-to assure that actions taken in multilateral fora reflect the un-
derlying values of our society and our legal system.
Multilateral discussions now often supplant the national statutory and
regulatory schemes crafted in the late 1970s and early 1980s to respond
to the threat of such environmental hazards as stratospheric ozone deple-
tion and the export of hazardous wastes. Tackling international environ-
mental problems in a global context has obvious benefits. A multilateral
setting provides a unique opportunity to design effective and efficient
international legal structures that advance critical environmental goals
while simultaneously reflecting the needs and expectations of all coun-
tries.
This trend toward multilateral resolution of international environmental
questions has generally been applauded. At the same time, there is con-
siderable potential for tension and even clashes between the procedure
and substance of the international and domestic legal frameworks. Con-
siderable differences exist between the international and national legal
orders with respect to questions of process. Many bedrock principles of
United States environmental and administrative law-including notice to
5. Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 7, § B & ch. 9, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
289, 377 (1993) (trade disciplines for sanitary and phytosanitary standards and other
domestic environmental and public health standards as potential non-tariff barriers to
trade).
6. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations in GATT, G.A.T.T. Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, § G & L, pt. C (Dec. 20, 1991)
(including draft text of the proposed agreement on technical barriers to trade and draft
decision by contracting parties on the application of the sanitary and phytosanitary mea-
sures).
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the public, an opportunity to be heard, and judicial review to assure
rational decision making--are reflected poorly, if at all, in the interna-
tional legal system. Indeed, the notion that any of these components
might be essential to the integrity of international legal processes, in-
cluding international environmental decision making, borders on heresy.
In extreme cases, decisions that could directly affect the health and well-
being of people within the United States could be lifted out of domestic
processes and placed in a legal context that barely acknowledges the
existence of individuals.
I. INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES AND DOMESTIC LAW
Legal obligations in the international environmental field arise
principally through international agreements, among which the "legisla-
tive" instruments of binding multilateral agreements have assumed prin-
cipal importance. The development of customary international law
through the accretion of widespread practice by states, a second mecha-
nism resulting in obligatory duties on the international level, has been
considerably less important in defining international environmental law.
Multilateral agreements in the environmental area increasingly articu-
late specific and often complex regulatory schemes with measurable,
crisp procedural and substantive requirements for implementation by
individual states. These multilateral instruments are analogous in many
ways to domestic regulatory structures in their precision. For example,
as the name suggests, the 1985 Protocol on Reduction of Sulfur Emis-
sions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent,7 requires
each state party to achieve a uniform percentage decrease in pollution,
measured from an agreed base year, by a firm deadline. The 1988 Pro-
tocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides (NO,) or
Their Transboundary Fluxes8 sets out highly specific technology-based
standards for pollution control. The 1989 Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Dis-
posal9 mandates detailed procedures governing the export of municipal
trash and toxic detritus. The subjects of these agreements, such as acid
rain and international traffic in hazardous wastes, often overlap with
7. Protocol on Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by
at Least 30 Per Cent, Sept. 2, 1987, reprinted in 27 LL.M. 698 (1988) [hereinafter
Protocol on Sulfur Emissions].
8. Oct. 31, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989) [hereinafter NO, Protocol].
9. Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), re-
printed in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
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domestic statutory requirements.
Although the products of these multilateral undertakings may bear
considerable resemblance to domestic environmental statutes or regula-
tions, the processes by which these instruments are formulated do not.
Because until relatively recently only states were considered subjects of
international law, multilateral bodies are still primarily organizations of
states represented by their governments. Presumably because they are
principally, if not exclusively, fora for intergovernmental negotiations,
many multilateral processes typically lack the openness and public ac-
countability accepted as a matter of course in domestic legislative and
administrative law.
Public scrutiny and access may be difficult or even non-existent.
Although some scientists, businesspersons, and non-governmental organi-
zations have managed to carve out niches for themselves as observers or
advisers to multilateral institutions, policy and practice among interna-
tional organizations regarding public participation has not been standard-
ized. Although some documents may circulate informally, distribution of
proposals for, and drafts of, multilateral agreements and other important
lawmaking instruments may also be confined to governments. Enforce-
ment and adjudicatory processes in the international legal system similar-
ly may exclude the public.
The recent and already celebrated "tuna/dolphin" GATI panel deci-
sion reflects in a microcosm the serious divergences between domestic
and international law and practice in making, implementing, and adjudi-
cating law and policy. Moreover, the tuna/dolphin decision demon-
strates the need for greater public participation in international processes.
The dispute involved a provision of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA),'0 a statute enacted in 1972 and amended in major respects in
1984" and 1988," but never fully implemented by the executive
branch. The current statute requires that the killing of dolphin by foreign
fleets incidental to fishing for yellowfin tuna be commensurate with that
of the United States fleet.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 [hereinafter MMPA]. The House of Representatives held
four days of public hearings on the bill which subsequently became the MMPA. See
H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4144, 4145.
11. Pub. L. No. 98-364, § 101, 98 Stat. 440 (1984). See H.R. REP. No. 758,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 639.
12. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711,
§ 4, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong,, 2d Sess. 14-19
(1984), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6155-59.
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The statutory sanction for a failure to meet this standard is trade
restrictions on yellowfin tuna imports from the offending country. The
Earth Island Institute, a private non-profit organization, sued in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California under
a theory of judicial review. The Institute obtained a court order directing
the executive branch to carry out its non-discretionary duties under the
MMPA by imposing a ban on imports of yellowfin tuna from Mexico
and other countries.' The executive branch then applied an administra-
tive regulation 4 promulgated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and adopted after the publication of a proposed
rule and an opportunity for public comment." Relying on that regula-
tion, NOAA made a finding that Mexico had satisfied the statutory stan-
dard and lifted the import prohibition. Subsequently, the district court
issued a second order reaffirming the ban after concluding that the regu-
lation was inconsistent with the MMPA and was therefore illegal. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firned both orders of the district court. 6
Mexico initiated a dispute settlement process against the United States
under the GATT, challenging the import ban as a non-tariff barrier to
trade. 7 Unlike the domestic legislative and administrative processes,
GAIT dispute settlement does not provide for participation by private
parties as intervenors or amici. In contrast to the opportunities for public
input into the domestic judicial process, but consistent with standard
GATT procedures, the documents and oral proceedings in the tu-
na/dolphin case were not accessible to the public. 8
13. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), afT'd,
929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
14. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(iv)-(ix) (1992); 55 Fed. Reg. 11,929 (1990).
15. NOAA initially published a proposed rule to implement the 1984 amendments
to the MMPA. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,963 (1986). The comment period on this proposal
was subsequently extended, in particular to give potentially affected foreign nations a
full opportunity to comment. 51 Fed. Reg. 36,568 (1986). NOAA then published an
interim final rule in 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 8910 (1988). A second interim final rule
with a request for comments, necessitated by the intervening amendments to the
MMPA enacted in 1988, was promulgated in 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 9,438 (1989). The
final regulation published in March 1990 reflected comments on the 1989 interim
final rule.
16. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. GATr, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 30 1.l.M.
1594 (1991) (concluding that MMPA ban is inconsistent with United States obligations
under GATIT).
18. See, e.g., Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
1993]
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In the tuna/dolphin case, however, the European Economic Communi-
ty and ten GATI parties other than the United States made written
submissions to the panel, all of which were critical of the MMPA ban
and most of which argued that the ban is inconsistent with GATT. Fur-
ther, the United States Government was represented in the GAIT dis-
pute settlement process by its executive branch, which had flouted three
statutory directives, adopted an illegal regulation, and reluctantly imple-
mented the import ban only under court order. Particularly against the
closed nature of the GATT process, questions as to whether the execu-
tive branch vigorously defended the validity of the ban naturally arose.
The inaccessibility of the proceedings to members of the public
strongly suggests that important perspectives were not adequately pre-
sented to the GATT dispute settlement panel, at least as a formal matter.
Although the executive branch solicited some input from certain mem-
bers of the public in the preparation of its submission, 9 those views at
most affected only the United States submission to the panel, which
must ultimately reflect the Government's position. While helpful, that
practice is not a substitute for an opportunity for written and oral sub-
missions directly to a dispute settlement panel.
In short, the many entry points for public participation in making,
implementing, and adjudicating law on the domestic level are duplicated
poorly, if at all, on the international level. In addition, as more and
more domestic regulatory issues are taken up in international contexts,
ment and Surveillance, Annex I 6(iv), GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE,
BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 210, 217 (26th Supp. 1980) (stating
that "[w]ritten memoranda submitted to the panel have been considered confidential,
but are made available to the parties to the dispute.") [hereinafter BISD]; see also
Decision on Improvements to the GAIT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
reprinted in BISD, supra, at 61 (36th Supp. 1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1031
(1989) (referencing suggested working procedures establishing that submissions of
parties to panels confidential and panel sessions closed); Draft Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 6, §
S U 12.1-2 (draft understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of
disputes under articles XXII and XXIII of the GAIT specifying that "written memo-
randa submitted to the panel shall be considered confidential"). Cf. North American
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2012, para. l(b) (specifying that "[tlhe
panel's hearings, deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and
communications with the panel shall be confidential").
19. Letter from Julius L. Katz, Deputy United States Trade Representative, to
Justin Ward, Senior Resource Specialist, and Al Meyerhoff, Senior Attorney, Natural
Resources Defense Council (Apr. 17, 1992) (on file with The American University
Journal of International Law and Policy).
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instances of this divergence will likely increase in number and frequen-
cy.
Although treaties adopted pursuant to constitutionally prescribed pro-
cesses and congressional legislation are of equal legal authority,' the
formulation of international commitments differs considerably from the
enactment of domestic statutes. The President, as the "sole organ of the
nation in its external relations,"'" has the exclusive power to "make
Treaties"' and, in effect, simultaneously to define both national law
and international legal obligations. In contrast to domestic legislation,
the President negotiates a treaty, often in secret, and then, after it has
been concluded, presents the treaty to the Senate for post hoc advice
and consent to subsequent ratification. The Administrative Procedure Act
exempts "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States"
from that statute's fundamental requirements for notice-and-comment
rulemaking.' Additionally, the "political question" doctrine, which pre-
cludes judicial review of certain actions of the political branches, and
especially the executive branch, has particular vitality in the area of
foreign relations. 4
Even if the "political question" doctrine does not apply, the courts
nonetheless have displayed a pronounced deference to executive branch
20. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that the Con-
stitution ranks treaties and legislative acts at the same level); 1 RESTATEiENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987) (stating that
an international treaty entered into by the United States becomes the law of the Unit-
ed States) [hereinafter RESTATEMNT].
21. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
23. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1988).
24. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (emphasizing that the political
question doctrine involves three questions: (1) whether the Constitution grants jurisdic-
tion over the issue to a different branch of Government; (2) whether the issue goes
beyond the expertise of the Court; and (3) whether there are valid considerations cau-
tioning against judicial intervention). See generally THONIAS M. FRANCK, PoLInCAL
QUESTIONs/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS? (1992) (questioning the longstanding exemption of foreign affairs from judicial
scrutiny); Thomas M. Franck, Courts and Foreign Policy. FORFIGN POL'Y, Summer
1991, at 66 (claiming that no structural reasons exist for preventing the courts from
hearing cases involving foreign affairs); Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ.
1255, 1305-17 (1988) (arguing that the "Iran-Contra affair" resulted from a lengthy
foreign policy process whereby the President circumvented legislative restraints to
executive branch power).
1993]
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interpretations of statutes that arise in a foreign affairs context. For in-
stance, in the mid-1980s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
banned the use of the fumigant ethylene dibromide (EDB) on domes-
tically-grown produce, acting on evidence that EDB increases the risks
of cancer, genetic mutations, and adverse reproductive effects in human
beings. In contrast, EPA promulgated a tolerance allowing imported
mangoes to contain EDB residues of thirty parts per billion (ppb) or
less. EPA subsequently extended the tolerance in response to assertions
by the Department of State that a complete ban would damage the econ-
omies of friendly exporting countries. In response to a petition for re-
view, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that, because EPA was required by statute to base
pesticide limits on health considerations alone, the agency's reliance
solely on foreign affairs concerns in establishing a pesticide residue
tolerance was illegal.'
On remand, EPA reaffirmed the residue limitation for imported man-
goes, but came up with new justifications for that tolerance. EPA stated
that a special exemption was warranted because of ongoing cooperative
efforts with food-exporting nations to ensure that fruits and vegetables
enter the United States free of pests like the Mediterranean fruitfly, dis-
eases, and unsafe levels of pesticides. Moreover, EPA asserted that
mango-producing nations were channelling export revenues into the
search for alternatives to EDB. Accordingly, EPA concluded that revok-
ing the EDB tolerance and prohibiting the importation of contaminated
mangoes into the United States would pose a greater risk to the food
supply than would the continued import of produce carrying pesticide
residues. This reasoning seems counter-intuitive at best. Nonetheless,
after EPA provided assurances that the EDB tolerance standard for im-
ported mangoes would be of limited duration, the court of appeals ap-
proved the very same tolerance that it had earlier rejected as a violation
of the statutory standard.'
Although the D.C. Circuit's second review of the EDB tolerance was
phrased as a pure question of statutory interpretation of the health-based
standard in the governing statute, the court could hardly have been deaf
to the Government's clear assertions of harm to foreign relations. As
this example demonstrates, there is a need to affirm process-oriented
25. National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
26. National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 815 F.2d
1579, 1581 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
[VOL. 9:1
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
values such as public participation not only on the international level,
but also in domestic proceedings regarding human welfare issues, such
as public health and the environment, that arise in a foreign affairs
context.
II. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE CONGRESS
As discussed above, the President may enter into treaties on behalf of
the United States pursuant to article II, section 2 of the Constitution
after the Senate gives its advice and consent by a two-thirds majority."
The executive branch, however, also concludes a distinct and very large
category of "executive agreements"' on behalf of the United States
which, unlike treaties in the strict constitutional sense, do not require
subsequent congressional endorsement.' Although subject to some de-
bate, the status of executive agreements in domestic law is very similar
to that of a congressionally-enacted federal statute or an article II, sec-
tion 2 treaty." Some executive agreements entered into by the execu-
tive branch rely on existing statutory authority, but are neither expressly
authorized by statute nor approved, like a treaty adopted pursuant to ar-
ticle II, section 2 of the Constitution, by the Congress after the fact."
27. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
28. "Executive agreements," entered into by the President without the requirement
that the Senate provide advice and consent, may have as their authority one or more
of the following: (1) congressional legislation; (2) an article II, section 2 treaty; or
(3) the President's own constitutional powers. 11 F.A.M. § 721.2, reprinted in 1 Mi-
cHAEL J. GLENNON & THoMAs M. FRANcK,. UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW: DocuMNTS AND SOURCEs 204 (1980) [hereinafter GLENNON & FRANCK].
29. Between 1949 and 1990, 683 international agreements were concluded as trea-
ties in the constitutional sense. In contrast, during the same period 12,122 executive
agreements-nearly eighteen times as many instruments-were entered into. Treaty Af-
fairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other
International Agreements Concluded During the Year (1991).
30. See RESTATMENr, supra note 20, § 303 (describing the position of executive
agreements in the domestic legal system). But see United States v. Guy IV. Capps,
Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affid on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955)
(invalidating an executive agreement as inconsistent with a statute); Swearingen v.
United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983) (invalidating an executive agree-
ment as inconsistent with a statute). Although possible as a matter of principle, the
number of instances in which courts have declined to give domestic legal effect to
international agreements is very small.
31. According to State Department policy, the choice between concluding an
international agreement as, on the one hand, a treaty as described in the Constitution
and, on the other, an executive agreement, is determined through consideration of the
1993]
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A number of international air pollution agreements demonstrate the po-
tential of this practice to "short circuit" congressional consultation and
participation in an area governed by the Clean Air Act, which is one of
the most complex regulatory schemes in existence.
After negotiations held under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP Convention)" was con-
cluded in 1979. An ancillary protocol (NO Protocol) to limit emissions
of the polluting nitrogen oxides, one of the principal components of acid
rain, was signed in 1988."3 Another protocol (VOC Protocol) on vol-
atile organic compounds, intended to address one of the primary causes
of photochemical smog pollution, was adopted in 1991.' After articu-
lating a nebulous commitment to "limit and, as far as possible, gradually
reduce and prevent air pollution," the LRTAP Convention sets out a
general framework for international cooperation, consultation, and ex-
change of information on air pollution. By contrast, the NO,, Protocol
states an overall obligation to limit emissions of the pollutants governed
following eight factors:
(1) the extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting
the nation as a whole;
(2) whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws;
(3) whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subse-
quent legislation by the Congress;
(4) past United States practice with respect to similar agreements;
(5) the preference of the Congress with respect to a particular type of agree-
ment;
(6) the degree of formality desired for an agreement;
(7) the proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of
an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term
agreement; and
(8) the general international practice with respect to similar agreements.
GLENNON & FRANCK, supra note 28, at 205. State Department policy also cautions
against any infringement upon the constitutional authority of the Congress and the
President. Id.
32. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 10,541 [hereinafter LRTAP Convention].
33. NO, Protocol, supra note 8.
34. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their
Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 19, 1991, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 573 (1992) (not in
force) [hereinafter VOC Protocol]. The United States is not party to a third protocol
to the LRTAP Convention addressing sulfur emissions. Protocol on Sulfur Emissions,
supra note 7.
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by that instrument to 1987 levels by 1994 and enumerates precise engi-
neering requirements for mobile and stationary sources of nitrogen ox-
ides. Likewise, the VOC Protocol contains overall emissions reduction
targets and timetables, supplemented by detailed technological require-
ments.
The United States entered into the LRTAP Convention and the NO.
and VOC Protocols as executive agreements without congressional par-
ticipation. Likewise, after the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990,' the United States concluded an executive agree-
ment with Canada after a decade-long, highly publicized dispute over
the transboundary impacts of acid rain. There was no public notice in
the Federal Register and no formal opportunity for the public to com-
ment on any of these four international environmental agreements. Al-
though the executive branch informally consulted with interested mem-
bers of Congress with respect to these air pollution pacts, the Congress
as an institution had no formal role in the adoption of these instruments,
either through prior authorization of their negotiation and conclusion or
through their entry into force as treaties after Senate advice and consent
to ratification.
These air pollution agreements may have serious domestic legal impli-
cations, despite the fact that some of the statutory and regulatory mech-
anisms for compliance were in place prior to the conclusion of the
agreements. The executive branch appears to have chosen the vehicle of
an executive agreement instead of an article 1H, section 2 treaty in each
case because the implementing authority necessary to fulfill the obliga-
tions in the agreement was supposedly already in place as a matter of
domestic law. No domestic statute, however, expressly authorizes these
four international agreements. Without prior or subsequent legislative
participation in these instruments, the executive branch's conclusion
regarding the adequacy of legal authority was necessarily unilateral.
"Locking in" the status quo at the international level through action
exclusively on the part of the executive branch may constrain future
legislative or administrative action in a manner which could well be
inconsistent with congressional intent. Both statutory"7 and constitu-
35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (Supp. IMl
1991) (containing the Clean Air Act acid rain program).
36. Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 30 1.-M.
676 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4(d), 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1988) (re-
quiring federal agencies to allow interested persons to participate in the rulemaking
1993]
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tional3" avenues for petitioning the Executive for regulatory modifica-
tions may be compromised.
Furthermore, and perhaps most important, these air pollution pacts
undertaken as executive agreements with little or no congressional input
may represent missed opportunities. The lack of formal notice may de-
prive the Congress and the public of a significant opportunity for input
on policy making at least as important as many administrative regula-
tions. For instance, the context of the 1991 bilateral Air Quality
Agreement with Canada suggests that that instrument was not viewed by
the executive branch as a serious vehicle for environmental policy mak-
ing. First, the agreement was concluded only after the enactment of
amendments to the Clean Air Act, which for the first time set out a
domestic regulatory structure specifically for combatting acid rain. Sec-
ond, the text of the 1991 agreement limits reductions in emissions of
acid rain precursors to levels required by the domestic statutory and
regulatory program. Finally, the decision to treat the bilateral instrument
as an executive agreement without formal participation by the legislature
eliminated the possibility that Congress or, for that matter, the Govern-
ment of Canada might utilize the agreement to address the need for
additional reductions necessitated by international considerations that
may not have been adequately addressed in the United States' legislative
process.
Although the proposition is sometimes difficult to demonstrate empiri-
cally, the form of these agreements as a matter of United States
law-executive agreements concluded without congressional participa-
tion-appears to have been predetermined by domestic political dynam-
ics before the content of the international compacts was settled. Conse-
quently, the outcome of these bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
which were consciously structured as lawmaking instruments on the
international level, would be substantially constrained by existing United
States legislation. If, as it appears to have been the case with each of
these air pollution agreements, congressional interest is low or non-exis-
tent, a least-common-denominator result constricted by the confines of
the municipal legal requirements of the United States is virtually inevita-
ble.
The treatment of two major agreements on the protection of the
process).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances").
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stratospheric ozone layer compellingly demonstrates the executive
branch's inconsistent approach to the question of choice of instrument.
As in the case of the ECE agreements,39 the executive branch expressly
concluded that the statutory authority to implement the Vienna Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' (Vienna Convention) and
the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer4'
(Montreal Protocol) was already in place at the time of their conclu-
sion. 2 But in contrast to the ECE air pollution instruments, Congress
had expressly authorized the ozone pacts by prior statute.0 If anything,
this explicit statutory authorization argues even more strongly than in
the case of the ECE agreements, for which there is no express legisla-
tive mandate, for treating the two ozone compacts as executive agree-
ments. Nonetheless, the executive branch submitted both the Vienna
Convention and the Montreal Protocol to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification as article II, section 2 treaties."
Executive agreements entered into without congressional participation,
based on the executive branch's unilateral interpretation of a statute, can
disrupt existing legislative and regulatory structures in unpredictable and
39. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
40. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985.
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
41. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987), reprinted in 52 Fed.
Reg. 47,515 (1987), adjusted and amended, June 29, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 4,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), adjusted and amended, Nov. 25, 1992, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (amendment not in force) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol]. See generally RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OzONE DIPLOMAcY: NEW DIRECTIONS
IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANEr (1991) (providing background on the Montreal Proto-
col by reporting and analyzing the negotiations concerning global environmental
threats which led to the Protocol, including resulting implementation problems).
42. See S. TREATY DOC. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. VII (1987) (citing
powers given to the Environmental Protection Agency as providing statutory authority
for the Montreal Protocol); S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. vii (1985)
(stating that the Vienna Convention does not commit the United States to an addition-
al regulatory undertaking, thus assuming domestic authority currently exists).
43. See Clean Air Act § 156, 42 U.S.C. 7456 (repealed 1990) (authorizing the
President to enter into international agreements to protect the stratosphere from ozone
depletion); cf Clean Air Act § 617, 42 U.S.C. § 7671p(a) (Supp. II 1991)
(authorizing the President to enter international agreements to protect the stratosphere).
44. See 134 Cong. Rec. S2109 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1988) (reporting the Senate
resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Montreal Protocol); 132 Cong.
Rec. 17,560 (1986) (reporting the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratifica-
tion of the Vienna Convention).
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unintended ways. ' For example, in Japan Whaling Association v.
American Cetacean Society,'  the Supreme Court construed the
Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act47 (Packwood Amendment) and the Pelly Amendment to
the Fishermen's Protective Act of 19678 (Pelly Amendment) in light of
a subsequent executive agreement49 with Japan. The existence of that
agreement was decisive in the Court's rejection of arguments that a
federal official had violated a statutory directive.'
Shortly after World War II, more than forty nations entered into a
multilateral agreement known as the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling' (Whaling Convention) that created the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC) 2 The IWC has the power to set
limits on the harvesting of various whale species.3 An "opt-out" proce-
dure allows each nation party to the Whaling Convention unilaterally to
reject these quotas, rendering them legally ineffective with respect to
that country as a matter of international law.' Although the quotas are
binding on member nations that do not opt out, the IWC nevertheless
has no power to impose sanctions for violations.5
The Pelly and Packwood Amendments attempt to reinforce the Whal-
ing Convention on the domestic level by requiring the Secretary of
Commerce to monitor the whaling activities of foreign nationals and to
investigate potential violations of the Whaling Convention. 6 Upon com-
45. See JOSEPH PAIGE, THE LAW NOBODY KNows 64-65 (1977) (observing that a
power struggle exists between the executive branch and Congress b'ecause executive
agreements deal not with just minor international matters, but with major issues of
growing significance) [hereinafter PAIGE].
46. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988) [hereinafter Packwood Amendment].
48. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1988) [hereinafter Pelly Amendment].
49. Agreement Concerning Commercial Sperm Whaling in the Western Division
Stock of the North Pacific, Nov. 13, 1984, U.S.-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 11,070.
50. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. at 241 (1986)
(concluding that no statutory violation occurred because the executive agreement fur-
thered original congressional intent by protecting whales).
51. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716.
52. Id. art. III, para. 1.
53. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
54. Id. art. V, para. 3.
55. Id. art. IX.
56. Packwood Amendment, supra note 47, at § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i); Pelly Amend-
ment, supra note 48.
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pletion of this investigation, the Secretary of Commerce must promptly
decide whether to certify conduct by foreign nationals that "diminishes
the effectiveness" of the Whaling Convention." After certification by
the Secretary of Commerce, the Packwood Amendment directs the Sec-
retary of State to reduce the offending nation's fishing allocation within
the United States' fishery conservation zone by at least fifty percent'
In 1981, the IWC established a zero quota for harvests of sperm
whales, a seriously depleted species. The following year, the IWC man-
dated a five-year moratorium on commercial whaling from 1985 until
1990. Japan's objection effectively relieved it, as an international legal
matter, from compliance with the sperm whale quotas. The potential
sanction under United States law in the form of the Pelly and Packwood
Amendments nonetheless threatened Japanese whaling for the 1984-85
season. Eventually, after lengthy negotiations the United States and
Japan concluded an executive agreement in which Japan agreed to catch
no more than 400 sperm whales, considerably more than the INVC's
quota, in each of the 1984 and 1985 seasons. Japan also agreed to cease
commercial whaling by 1988, three years after the date specified by the
IWC. In return, the executive branch promised not to impose sanctions
against Japan under the Pelly and Packwood Amendments.
Several environmental organizations sued to compel the Secretary of
Commerce to certify Japan pursuant to the Pelly and Packwood Amend-
ments in spite of the bilateral agreement. This case squarely presented
the question whether an executive agreement concluded without con-
gressional participation was consistent with a statutory enactment. The
Supreme Court, reversing both the district court and the court of ap-
peals, decided that the Secretary of Commerce had no mandatory duty
to certify a country in response to BVC quota violations. Although the
bulk of the opinion deals with the construction of the Pelly and
Packwood Amendments, the chosen interpretation was apparently
strongly influenced by the existence of the agreement with Japan as an
acceptable, if alternative, means of achieving an approximation of the
statutory goal.
In this case, the international agreement in dispute was an executive
agreement, entered into on behalf of the United States by the President
without consent or input from the Congress. Neither of the applicable
legislative enactments authorized the negotiation of the agreement, nor
was the particular agreement with Japan endorsed by the Congress either
57. Packwood Amendment, supra note 47, at § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i).
58. Packwood Amendment, supra note 47, at § 1821(e)(2)(B).
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before or after conclusion of that instrument. Indeed, in July of 1984
Senator Packwood explicitly requested the assurances of the Secretary of
Commerce that "any nation which continues whaling after the moratori-
um takes effect will be certified under" the statutory enactment bearing
the Senator's name. 9 Although the question remains the subject of con-
siderable debate, some authority suggests that such an agreement must
be consistent with existing legislation.' The Court in effect dodged the
question by interpreting the conflict out of existence, but simultaneously
contorted the statutory framework through an interpretation that was
arguably inconsistent with congressional intent.
CONCLUSION
As noted in another context, "[tjhe validity and moral authority of a
conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached.""1 At
least two initiatives would tend to minimize discontinuities between the
modes by which conclusions are reached on the international level on
the one hand, and in our domestic legal system on the other, while still
preserving the integrity of the international obligations of the United
States: (1) regularizing public participation in international regulatory
processes at the national level by statute; and (2) encouraging greater
congressional participation in international agreements not expressly
authorized by statute.
Perhaps the most obvious divergences between international and na-
tional law involve considerations of process. As more environmental
threats governed by domestic regulatory structures are addressed in the
international arena, such as the GAIT tuna/dolphin dispute, a commen-
surate increased need arises for improved processes for public participa-
tion in international activities undertaken by the United States Govern-
ment. To ameliorate the effects of resulting discontinuities, multilateral
59. Letter from Senator Bob Packwood to Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Com-
merce (June 28, 1984), quoted in Brief for Respondents at 17-18, Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (Nos. 85-954 & 85-955).
60. See supra note 26. See also LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS 162 (1984) (arguing for congressional input for all international
agreements) [hereinafter JOHNSON]; cf. PAIGE, supra note 45, at 91 (describing the
broad scope of executive power to make agreements without congressional involve-
ment).
61. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149, 171
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that the process, in terms of the right to a
fair hearing, gives administrative decisions their legitimacy).
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fora like GAIT might adopt rules of procedure that regularize and
greatly expand public access to, and public accountability of, their law-
making, law-enforcing, and adjudicatory processes. Without question,
improved access and public participation at the international level is the
most desirable way to reconcile these disparities, while simultaneously
furthering the larger public policy goals of improving the legitimacy and
accountability of the international legal system.
A great deal can also be done at the purely national level in the
absence of progress at the international level, or until multilaterally
agreed-upon measures are implemented. First, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's foreign affairs exception' should be reevaluated. The under-
lying justification for that provision is no longer warranted, if ever it
was. The foreign affairs exception is an unsophisticated mechanism
governing a sphere of the law that has become increasingly nuanced and
complex. The enumerated powers of Congress include many environ-
mental concerns. The national legislature has reacted to environmental
challenges by establishing a complex web of statutory and regulatory
directives. For that reason, this area is fundamentally different from
traditional security and foreign affairs concerns, like the conduct of war
and the recognition of foreign governments, entrusted by the Constitu-
tion to the President. Likewise, international undertakings on environ-
mental matters governed by statute are well within the reach of congres-
sional lawmaking authority. Accordingly, the unusual deference to the
executive branch contained in the Administrative Procedure Act's ex-
ception to notice-and-comment rulemaking is not warranted merely be-
cause of the international context for decision making.
Second, Congress should replace the sweeping exemption in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act with comprehensive new legislation that ar-
ticulates how basic principles of American public law will be applied in
a foreign affairs context. At a minimum, this legislation should establish
standards for distinguishing between those domains, such as war and the
recognition of foreign governments, that are appropriate for an exemp-
tion like that currently in the Administrative Procedure Act, and those,
like environmental problems, that are not. For the latter category, actions
of the executive branch taken in a foreign policy context ought to be
treated similarly to those that arise in a purely domestic setting. To
further this goal, outcome-neutral procedures analogous to notice-and-
comment rulemaking' and judicial review' should be established for
62. See supra note 23 (noting the Administrative Procedure Act exclusion of
military and foreign affairs functions from notice and comment requirements).
63. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
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application to actions taken by the executive branch on behalf of the
United States on the international level, such as the negotiation of inter-
national agreements.
As in strictly domestic circumstances, these reforms can be expected
to assure consistency of executive branch action with domestic statutory
and regulatory programs and to reflect the underlying values of our
social and legal systems. Processes could be specifically tailored to meet
the needs of governmental decision making in national, bilateral, and
multilateral contexts. For instance, new legislation might require the pub-
lication of interim drafts of proposed international agreements in the
Federal Register, with a subsequent opportunity for formal public com-
ment to United States negotiators, unless the President provides compel-
ling reasons, such as overriding national security concerns, to justify a
waiver.
The Japan Whaling case demonstrates the disruptive effect interna-
tional agreements can have on carefully crafted domestic legislative
regimes.' Existing statutory and regulatory schemes can mesh smoothly
with treaties and executive agreements authorized by the Congress
through legislative participation in defining the terms of those interna-
tional instruments." Moreover, congressionally-sanctioned international
agreements have the imprimatur of the legislative branch as the law of
the land. By contrast, executive agreements not expressly contemplated
by statute, even if not strictly inconsistent with existing law, can none-
theless substantially modify or even frustrate the operation of existing
legislation and regulation without the participation of the legislative
branch.
That an agreement can be given effect without the enactment of sub-
sequent legislation by Congress, .as set out in State Department policy, is
not by itself sufficient evidence of consistency with congressional intent
as expressed in an existing legislative scheme. Nor does that test pro-
vide adequate legal justification as a matter of course in the absence of
express prior statutory authorization for the choice of an executive
agreement instead of either an article II, section 2 treaty or a congres-
64. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 46-59.
66. See JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 160-63 (suggesting that some congressional
participation be provided for in the creation of executive agreements).
67. See id. at 9 (noting that the Department of State classifies international agree-
ments, and determines the degree to which the Executive Branch can make agree-
ments, but does not necessarily judge accurately the original congressional grant of
statutory authority).
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sional-executive mechanism requiring the participation of the legislature.
The mere existence of statutory authority in a particular area does not,
consequently, imply that an executive agreement that has domestic legal
effect and that purports to rely on that authority is consistent with the
underlying congressional purpose. Further, reliance on an executive
agreement not expressly contemplated by statute could be questionable
when implementation is intended to be accomplished by new regulations
or rulemakings pursuant to existing statutes. In such a case, the interna-
tional. agreement could compromise the regulatory process, thereby un-
dermining important principles of administrative law like those in the
Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, even when both statutory and
regulatory authorities are in place, the choice of an executive agreement
would be inappropriate because of its tendency through international
processes to constrain future legislative and administrative choices.
As State Department policy also recognizes, however, resolution of
the historically delicate question of "choice of instrument" is quite sensi-
tive to context and depends in part on the level of congressional inter-
est. In such 'situations, silence, indifference, or acquiescence by the
Congress can carry legal significance. As a result, Congress, whether by
inattention or design, can be as much to blame as the Executive for
inconsistencies that arise from lawmaking through executive agreements
concluded without legislative participation. For example, Senator
Packwood appears to have been the only member of Congress to object
to the 1984 bilateral whaling agreement with Japan.
Questions about the necessary threshold level of congressional interest
can lead to thorny inter-branch disputes on a case-by-case basis. Con-
gress ought to consider addressing this generic question through legisla-
tion which articulates the requisite legislative concern in across-the-board
fashion for each executive agreement not previously authorized by stat-
ute, which is intended to have domestic effect, and which falls within
the enumerated powers of the Congress under article I of the Constitu-
tion. With a stroke of the pen, Congress could expressly negate any in-
ference that the Executive has carte blanche to negotiate international
agreements that the executive branch as a unilateral matter considers
consistent with domestic statutory and regulatory requirements.
Legislative participation in formulating and giving domestic legal
effect to international agreements within realms of statutory concern will
almost by definition tend to assure greater consistency with overall
statutory purposes. For instance, the legislation might require the execu-
tive branch to transmit interim drafts of this sub-category of executive
agreements to relevant congressional committees and establish a process
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for regularized consultation with those committees. By providing for
predictable legislative input with respect to this subset of executive
agreements, such a routine process for congressional consultation would
facilitate consistency with, and the continued efficacy of, domestic statu-
tory regimes by the body that created those frameworks in the first
place.
The Congress could also enact legislation with instructions to the
judiciary that executive agreements on matters within the enumerated
powers of Congress must be explicitly authorized by statute to have
effect as domestic law. Alternatively, the Executive could itself decide to
alter its practice with respect to this sub-category of executive agree-
ments. In any event, greater congressional input into this class of execu-
tive agreements can be expected to have the additional, indirect benefit
of facilitating greater public input with respect to executive branch de-
cision making on regulatory issues that arise in a foreign policy context.
For this same sub-category of agreements, there should also be an ex-
plicit instruction to the courts to decide questions of statutory interpreta-
tion notwithstanding the political question doctrine and foreign affairs
implications. Further, the legislation should address the current overly
broad discretion of the courts, short of a conclusion of nonjusticiability
through application of the political question doctrine, haphazardly to take
broad account of foreign relations concerns in judicial decisions with
few apparent standards. Instead, Congress ought to substitute principles
governing the judicial calculus to clarify the legal force of an executive
branch action taken in an international context, within the enumerated
powers of Congress, intended to have domestic legal effect, and not
expressly authorized or participated in by Congress.
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